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NULLA POENA SINE LEGE
By JEROME HALL f
NULLA poena sine lege has several meanings.' In a narrower con-
notation of that specific formula it concerns the treatment-consequence
element of penal laws: no person shall be punished except in pur-
suance of a statute which fixes a penalty for criminal behavior. Em-
ployed as nullum crimen sine lege, the prohibition is that no conduct
shall be held criminal unless it is specifically described in the behavior-
circumstance element of a penal statute. In addition, tudla poena sine
lege has been understood to include the rule that penal statutes must be
strictly construed. A final, important signification of the rule is that
penal laws shall not be given retroactive effect. Obviously, it is necessary
to keep each of the above meanings distinct.
I. OIuGIs
The view one finds most frequently expressed is that the rule, despite
its Latinity, is not of Roman origin 2 but was born in eighteenth century
Liberalism. The matter is not so simple. A few threads persist to per-
plex; they refute an all-too-facile history, even though they may not
establish a clear, unbroken line of development.'
True it is that the "extraordinary" offenses of Roman jurisprudence
suggest almost unlimited discretion in the judiciary. But side by side
with eztraordinaria judicia may be found insistence upon pre-definition
of offense and penalty. As regards first malefactors, magisterial discre-
tion probably joined appeal to the populace to provide specific decisions,
which, in course of time, defined "ordinary" offenses governed by pre-
-Professor of Law, Louisiana State University Law School The author vishes 'to
acknowledge his indebtedness to Virginia L. North for very helpful research assistanmc.
1. gee Roux, CouRs nE DRorr CrmsE FRANcAs (1927) 16-1 1 GArmAuD, Dxor
PENAL FRa cs (3rd ed., 1913) § 137. The most detailed discussion I have sew fi
DE LA MoRANDiEBE, DE LA REGLE NuaA POENA SINE LEcE (1910) (Recueil Sirty).
2. SCHOTrLAENDER, DIE GE5scIcHTLiCHE ENTWICKLUNG DES SATzES: NULLA IoEMA
sInE LEE (1911) STRA.EcHTLiCHE ABHANDLUNGEN, Heft 132, at 1; Matzke, Juristischc
Wochenschrift, 7 July 1934; Klee, Strafe ohne geschriebenes Gesetz (1934) D. 3. Z.
641-643; DRosT, DAs Eas:ESSEN DES STRAMcHiMs (1930) SO ff.
3. See ShAcHAc-DAvmsoN, 1 PROBLEMS oF THE Ro.AN CnmUAL LAw (1912)
103, 104.
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scribed rule.4 There is evidence, also, that though specified penalties
could be mitigated, they could not be increased.5 Certainly as to Roman
citizens, and in the ordinary course of administration, there were long
periods when prescribed penalties had to be strictly adhered to.0 This
rule reached its most rigorous statement in the Roman law with Sulla
who insisted that for certain crimes both offense and penalty be exactly
described in the statute under which the accusation was brought.1
The prohibition against retroactivity of penal laws was well known
and followed under Sulla; long before that it appears to have been ap-
proved by the Greeks.' Under Augustus several penal laws were declared
to be non-retroactive, although not until 440 A.D. was the principle itself
enacted.9
The rule in its several aspects thus had a vague and checkered Roman
history. But clouded as it is in the uncertainty of sporadic expression,
flanked by the well-known extraordinaria judicia, appeals to the populace,
and such wide powers as those under the Principate, nevertheless certain
minima appear -more than enough to require that the search for ori-
gins be directed far back of the eighteenth century.
We shall not inquire into the ramifications of the rule in the Middle
Ages1° nor into the question whether the penalization by canon law of
"offenses against conscience" completely barred its application to major
crimes.11 Without doubt, the mediaeval doctrine of the primacy of law
was deeply rooted' until challenged in its theological, authoritarian
4. Id. at 108.
5. D. 48. 19. 42; D. 50. 17.
6. D. 50. 16. 131 provides: "Poena non irrogatur, nisi quae quaque lege vel quo
alio jure specialiter huic delicto imposita est." 12 SCOTT, THE Cwvm LAw (1932) 278
("a penalty is not inflicted unless it is expressly imposed by law, or by some other
authority."). See also D. 50. 16. 244. ". . . an appeal cannot be taken from a penalty,
for where anyone is convicted of an offense, the penalty for it is fixed, and must be
paid at once."
"Hence, the differences between these things becomes apparent, because certain
penalties are prescribed for certain illegal acts; but this is not the case with fines, as
,the judge has power to impose any fine he pleases, unless the amount which he may
impose is fixed by law." Ibid.; 11 ScoTT, supra, at 296.
7. See SCHOTrLAENDE, op. cit. supra note 2, at 9, 10.
8. 2 VINOGRADOFF, OUTLINES OF HISTO ICAL JURISPRUDENCE (1922) 139, 140'
9. SCHOTTLAENDER, op. cit. sitpra note 2, at 16 if; see also "Neino poles inutlare
'zonsilium .sum in alterius iniuriam." D. 50. 17. 75. Code 1.14.7.
For a summary of this history see Dash v. Van Kleeck, 7 Johns. 477 (N. 11'. 1811).
10. See GRAF and DIETHERR, DIE DEUTSCHEN RECHTSSPRICIIWORTF (1864) 286,
'Nos. 7, 9, 10; DANIELS and GRUBEN, DIE GLOSSE ZUM SACUSISCHEN W-ICIIBILDRECUT,
• 334.
11. See PETRONCELLI, IL PRINCIPIO DELLA NON RETROATTIVITA DELLU LEGGI IN DIRITTO
CANONICO, 29 PUBBLICAZIONI DELLA UNIVERSITA CATTOLIcA DEL SA'ZRO CuoRE (1931).
12. See GIERKE, POLITICAL THEORIES OF THE MIDDLE AGES (Trans. Maitland, 1927)
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aspect by the rise of the modem state. On the other hand, one must
not read into ancient doctrine those special meanings which the rule
took on in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Hence those who
find the origin of niulla poena, in its present significance, in Magna
Carta"3 are on unsettled territory. At the same time, it is probable that
"lex terrae" in the famous 39th clause did mean more than procedural
guarantees. More likely was it a limitation of both process and substan-
tive law upon the royal prerogative.14
In English history the principle of law as limitation is prominent
from the time of the Charter of Henry the First; it is reiterated in the
Constitution of Clarendon in 1164. Magna Carta is the great symbol
of the socio-political forces that established the supremacy of the Rule
of Law in England ; 8 with Bracton it is already urged vigorously. The
movement is evidenced rather than created by subsequent petitions and
bills of right.1" The rise of Parliament plays an important part;17 and,
13. See MErZGER, STRAFRECHT (1933) 77.
14. "The struggle was waged to secure trial in properly constituted courts of justice
and in accordance with established law. The latter requirement would apply equally to
substantive rules as far as they existed, and to procedure." VxoncGAorF in MAA,,,
CARTA CO mmSEORATION ESSAYS (1917) 85; see also PowicM in id., at 121; McKrEcHnm,
MAGNA CARTA (2d ed. 1914) at 379, 380, 394; McLwAihE, HIGH CouRt oF PAnIA%-
1ENT (1910) at 55.
15. Over five hundred years ago, Fortescue wrote: "In such a Constitution, under
such [humane] laws, every man may live safely and securely." And those who lool: only
to eighteenth and nineteenth century liberalism for the origin of concern for the individual,
should read the ringing passage, in which he says: "Indeed, one would much rather
that twenty guilty persons should escape the punishment of death, than that one inno-
cent person should be condemned, and suffer capitally." DE LAWDinus Lx t ANGUAE
(trans. Gregor, 1874) c. 27, at 94.
16. See the Resolution of March 29, 1628 passed by the House, quoted by PoLLcn,
ESSAYS IN JURISPRUDENCE AND ETHICS (1882) 225, and the Petition of Grievances of
Commons to James I, 1610, quoted id., at 221.
17. Compare the following with eighteenth and nineteenth century liberalism on
the Continent: Sir Robert Phillips-" . . . the Right of the Subject is thus bul-
warked by the law of the kingdom . . ." ". . • I can live although another vithout
title be put to live with me;'.nay, I can live, although I pay Excises and Impositions
for more than I do: but to have my liberty, which is the soul of my life, tal:en from
me by power, and to be pent up in a gaol without remedy by law, and thus to be so
adjudged to perish in gaol; 0 improvident ancestors! 0 unwise forefathers! To be
so curious in providing for the quiet possession of our lands, and liberties of p3rlia-
ment, and to neglect our persons and bodies, and to let them die in prison, and that
duranfe bene placito, remediless. If this be Law, why do we talk of our Liberties."
Coke: ". . . it is against law, that men should be committed, and no cause shewed
. . . it is not I, Edward Coke, that speaks it, but the Records that speaks it; we
have a national appropriate Law to this nation . . . "
"Then the House of Commons came to the following Resolutions: Resolved. '1.
That no Freeman ought to be detained or kept in prison, or otherwise restrained by
the command of the king or privy council, or any other, unless some cause of the
commitment, detainer, or restraint be expressed, for which by law he ought to be
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indeed, it is parliamentary influence which in fact transformed what
might only in a very vague style be termed nulla poena into some real
approximation to the rule. For with legislation came gradual subordina-
tion of common law and, also, the distinctive techniques of statutory con-
struction which characterize the continental significance of the rule.1 8
But England ran far ahead of the continent in imposing law upon
government. The Prussian Code of 1721 provided that offenses which
were not enumerated in the territorial code nor provided for by the im-
perial law, should be judged ex aequo et bono, except that the more
difficult cases should be personally decided by the king. The Bavarian
Code of 1751 directed that cases not provided for by the Code should
be decided "ex aequitate et analogia juris," and the Austrian Code of
1769 provided that "cases not set forth in the Code should be decided
according to the principles laid down in the Code.""
Long before the French Revolution,2" the movement for codification
had advanced some of the ideas underlying nulla poena on its technical
side. Indeed, it was in the Code of the Austrian monarch, Joseph II,
(1787) that specific prohibition of analogy first entered the modem
criminal law.2' The English tradition of the rule of law,2 2 translated by
committed, detained, or restrained'." Proceedings in Parliament Relating to Liberty
of the Subject, 3 STATE TRIALS (1627-1628) at 65, 66, 78, and 82.
18. "A penal law then, shall not be extended by construction. The law of England
does not allow of constructive offenses, or of arbitrary punishments. No man incurs a
penalty unless the act which subjects him to it, is clearly both within the spirit and
the letter of the statute imposing such penalty. 'If these rules are violated,' said Best,
C. J. in the case of Fletcher v. Lord Sondes [3 Bingham 580], 'the fate of accused
persons is decided by the arbitrary discretion of judges, and not by the express authority
of the laws I'" DwAmus, A GENERAL TREATISE ON STATUTES (1873) at 247.
19. See SCHOTTLAENDER, Op. cit. supra note 2, at 43-44. Affinity with the German
law of June, 1935, is apparent. See note 43, infra.
20. "The main thesis of this work [Essay of GLOBIG and HusTE on CRIMINAL
LEGISLATION (1783)] was the need of a code which contained a complete and plain
formulation of the criminal law." VON BAR, A HISTORY OF CONTINENTAL CRIMINAL LAw
(1916) 248.
That the Constitutio Bambergensis (1507), Arts. 125-.126, prohibited inferior courts
from applying customary penal law and also prohibited analogy by inferior justices.
See SCHOTTLAENDER, Op. cit. supra note 2, at 36-37.
21. See VON BAR, op. cit. supra note 20, at 252.
22. The American Declaration of Independence complained that the king "has made
judges dependent on his will alone for the tenure of their offices, and the amount and
payment of their salaries;" and the American Colonies generally had asserted the
English tradition guaranteeing against conviction for any crime except by the law
of the land; see also " . . . William Penn in the preface to the plan of government
prepared for Pennsylvania, in 1682, declared that 'any government is free to the people
under it, where the laws rule, and the people are a party to those laws'." 2 KENT,
COMMENTARmES (1896) 4, n. (a); cf. N. Y. Act of 13 May 1691; Mass. Const. of 1780,
Art. 12; Laws of Mass. 1672, at 1; 1702, at 1; 1750, at 1; 1784, at 1.265; 1795, at 1;
all cited in State v. Danfqrth, 3 Conn. 112, 118 (1819).
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eighteenth century French philosophers' into terms expressive of the
Revolutionary ideology, joined with the continental movement for codi-
fication to provide nulla poena with its particular, current meanings.
We must remember, too, that in revolutionary France the thesis of
judicial severity and arbitrariness in the ancien rigiine was, rightly or
wrongly, almost unquestioned. That proposition coincided with and
facilitated the rise to power of the legislature. 4 Lafayette, who partici-
pated actively in the Revolutionary Assembly of 1789, proposed the
drafting of a Declaration of the Rights of Man- his inspiration com-
ing, it is said, from the Virginia Declaration. On August 26, 1789, the
famous Diclaration appeared, containing in its eighth article the provi-
sion: "Null ne peut itre puni qu'en zertu d'une loi itablie et pronzulgutc
antgrieurement au delit et ligalement appliquge." The Diclaration fixed
the prevailing meanings of itulla poena not only as a basic constitutional
safeguard of the individual against oppressive government but also as a
cardinal tenet of penal law. The rule was restated in the French Consti-
tution of September 3, 1791; it was not repeated in the Code Pinal of
1791, although the Military Code of that year did contain it.25 It reap-
peared in the French Code of 1810, thence to remain practically un-
changed.26
The rule was incorporated in the Bavarian Code drafted by Feuerbach
in 1813; not until 1850 did it appear in the Prussian Constitution, nor
until 1851 in the Prussian Code,27 and not until 1870 in the Reich Code.
It was omitted from the Reich constitutions of 1849 and 1871, although
it appeared in most of the federal state constitutions- Bavaria's as
early as 1818, Wurtenberg's in 1819.28
Feuerbach is generally credited with the statement of nulla poena in
its current form. His Lehrbuch dcs peinlichen Rechts first appeared in
1801 -at the peak of liberal revolutionary reform, at the zenith of
Classicism in general. He enunciated three principles 0 and declared that
23. For Voltaire's drastic experience in France and his appreciation of English
law and liberty, see DicEY, LAW OF THE CONSTITtrriO. (1931) 180, 185-186.
24. See M. Bergasse's address in the Assemblee Nationale, quoted by BucXEY
et Roux, 2 HisToiRE PA LEMENTAIRE DE LA REvOLuTzo; FRACAISE 284.
25. Pt. 1, Arts. 1 and 2.
26. See the present article 4 of the Code p6nal: "Nlle cotra'ntion, nul dHiit,
nul crime ne peuvent itre puids de peines qui n'Witaent Pas pronloie&s tar la lol a=ant
qu'ils fussent comms:"
27. The Prussian Code of 1794 [Intro. Sec. 87] provided that "acts and omissions
which are not prohibited by the laws cannot be regarded as crimes." But "laws" here
included Natural Law. SCHOrIAENDER, Op. cit. supra note 2, at 49.
28. Prohibition of analogy was included in the Projects for German Penal Codes
in 1909, 1913, 1919, and 1925. See AcEmERSANx, DAs ANALOG.MT'AT I U ELMMl U
UND ZUKUNFTIGEN STRAFRECHT (1934) Heft 348, STrAR'caTcnm u AuI[ANDLUNGER .
29. Par. 24.
19371
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they should be adopted without exception: nulla poena sine lege, nulla
poena sine crimine, nullum crimen sine poena legali.
Feuerbach's integration of prevailing political ideology with the crim-
inal law was simple enough: one who violates the liberty guaranteed by
the social contract and safeguarded by penal law commits a crime."' All
future offenders cannot be known in advance and physically coerced;
hence, he argued that the essential purpose of punishment must be deter-
rence by threat, i.e., it must be psychological. Incidental purposes were
direct deterrence by witnessing the infliction of punishment, making the
state secure through incapacitation of the offender, and reformation of
offenders. 2 Like Bentham"3 he insisted upon strict adherence to the
statute; he rejected analogy completely; and his general view of the
judicial function would, by later standards, be regarded as extremely
narrow, even naive.34 But his plan was not mere terrorism; he would
temper penalty with humanitarianism. To his theory of psychological
constraint, Feuerbach added those principles regarding the punishment
of offenders which have generally been associated with English Utili-
tarianism and Classical penology. These philosophical views and the
political ideology that fused them with the law have persisted-and not
least as regards retroactivity of penal law.
II. RETROACTIVITY
English history is not without a number of instances of ex post facto
penalization 35 - some for very serious offenses.3" These were political
cases that arose during turbulent Stuart times. They are suggestive of
the use of the coercive legal apparatus during crises rather than relevant
to the general problem of retroactivity. No constitutional provision ex-
pressly forbids retroactivity in England as does the American Consti-
tution. But the bias against such penal legislation is deeply embedded
30. The current German slogan merely omits the last word (legal) in Feuerbach's
third rule. See Schmitt (1934) D. J. Z. 691.
31. LEHDBUCH DES PEINLICHEN RECHTS (1801) par. 28.
32. Id. at par. 133.
33. Bentham had written: "Hence the first law with which a great code ought to
be begun, should be a general law of liberty-a law which should restrain delegated
powers, and limit their exercise to certain particular occasions, for certain specific
causes." PRINCIPLES OF PENAL LAw, Pt. 3, ch. xx; 1 WORKS (Bowring 1843) 576,
34. Compare Livingston for the fullest American expression of these views.
35. Recent examples of ex post facto legislation are the lex van der Lubbe and
like treatment of Communists which rode in the face of prohibitions in the Weimar
constitution. The "execution" of Roehm and his associates was also subsequently
declared "legal".
36. King v. Thurston, 1 Lev. 91, 83 Eng. Rep. 312 (1663); for other instances
collected, see Calder v. Bull, 3 Dall. 386 (U. S. 1798).
[Vol. 47: 165
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in the common law." A mere handful of truly retroactive public laws
are found in the English reports, 8 and these seem invariably to have
been intended to relieve an individual or a group from what was deemed
an unjust hardship.3"
In a sense, to be sure, all case law -and that includes jurisprudence
interpretative of statutes or codes - operates retroactively. For only
fictitiously can it be said that all acts found to be criminal upon trial
were criminal when committed. The fact is that it is the subsequent
decision which reaches back into time and places the authoritative stamp
of criminality upon the prior conduct. The theory is otherwise. In most
cases, too, it is reasonably certain in advance that particular acts will
be declared criminal; but there are the exceptions. There are behavior
and circumstances with regard to which no one can say that they were
within the prescription; there are cases, landmarks in every modern sys-
tem of law, where the courts make new law by their redefinition of
statutes or of jurisprudence. The lines shade imperceptibly into one
another. Proof of substantial, if not complete, non-retroactivity as re-
gards judicial decision must rest upon the inertia of language, facts, and
moral ideas, and upon the utility of concepts (including rules of law)
to function as reasonably reliable vehicles of the common aspects of
phenomena that may be far apart chronologically. In any event, the
relatively rare appearance of judicial penal legislation provides no reason
for not barring retroactivity in its simpler statutory manifestation where
it is clearly present.
An additional problem needs to be fairly confronted. Underlying the
revulsion against retroactivity of penal laws is a simple assumption: it
is unjust that what was legal when done should be subsequently held
criminal, that what was punishable by a minor sanction when committed
should later be punished more severely. Obviously there will be no dis-
agreement as to these value-judgments if the act when done was moral,
37. Even Bentham wrote: "This is one of the noblest characteristics of the English
tribunals: they have generally followed the declared will of the legislator with scrupulous
fidelity, or have directed themselves as far as possible by previous judgments . . .
This rigid observance of the laws may have had some inconveniences in an incomplete
system, but it is the true spirit of liberty which inspires the English with so much
horror for what is called an ex post facto law." 1 XVomxs (Bowring 1843) 326. See
ALLEN, LAw IN THE MAKING (2d ed. 1930) at 274 ff.; Phillibs v. Eyre, L R. 6
Q. B. 1, 23 (1870) ; R_ v. Griffiths, [1891] 2 Q. B. 145, 148. But see Ex parte Clinton,
6 STATE TUALs (x.s.) 1105, 1107 (1845).
38. See ALLEN, op. cit. supra note 37, at 275-276.
39. Ibid. The American colonies early provided against retroactivity. As to
substantive law, the problem has rarely been raised in the Supreme Court. See
Cummings v. Missouri, 71 U. S. 277 (1866); Ex Pare Garland, 71 U. S. 333 (1866),
both outgrowths of post civil war legislation. On the problem generally, se Smead,
The Ride Against Retroacth'e Legislation: A Basic Principle of .urisprudence (1936)
20 MINN. L. REv. 775.
NULLA POEATA SINE LEGE
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or at least not immoral. But why should not the perpetrator of a clearly
immoral act be punished by subsequently enacted law? Why not in such
cases increase an existing penalty to one that is "adequate"? Does not
"substantial justice" require affirmative replies?
Apologists of retroactivity ridicule the notion that the lawbreaker is
entitled to notice of the possible penalty he may incur. While they wish
"to strike terror into the hearts of criminals,"' 40 they argue that ex-
perience and observation have amply demonstrated that sanctions do not
deter, and that it is a vestige of a rationalistic age to believe that the
would-be offender will weigh the advantage of his crime against the
evil of his possible punishment. Yet criminals who give no heed to any
possible punishment are elsewhere said by these same criminologists to
be such students of the lav that they operate in areas which are just
beyond the reaches of the statute. 41 This paper cannot elaborate upon
the validity of the fundamental values that lie at the basis of the judg-
ment which heartily condemns retroactivity of penal laws. Premised is
a "value cosmos," which is something quite different from either formal
ethics or "preferential attitudes."
But there is another phase of the problem and another body of opinion
which should be mentioned here. I refer to the insistence by many crim-
inologists, in the United States, as elsewhere, that the criminal act should
be entirely ignored, that punishment, or, as they prefer, "treatment",
should depend entirely upon the personality of the offender and his dan-
gerousness to society. This notion goes beyond challenge of the guar-
antee against retroactivity; since it eliminates requirement of any act
whatever- post-law or ante-law- as regards the basis for subjection
to penal treatment, relative occurrence of behavior becomes irrelevant.
A plausible rationalization of deliberate retroactivity cannot be made.
More important, because more convincingly challenged, is dillum crimen
sine lege interpreted as a prohibition on the use of analogy.
III. ANALOGY AND INTERPRETATION
Analogy is, strictly speaking, a likeness of relationships. But the term
has a more popular connotation, and it is that to which the law more
nearly adheres. To illustrate what is popularly termed "reasoning by
analogy": two phenomena resemble each other in certain features which
are regarded not as accidental but as essential and which are deemed to
preponderate over the known differences. A proposition is known to be
true of one phenomenon; it is then inferred to be true of the other.
40. See Franck, quoted by Cantor, Prison Reform in Germany-1933 (1934) 25 J.
Crin. L. 84, 88.
41. See Franck, quoted by Preuss, Punishment by Analogy in National Socialist
Penal Law (1936) 26 J. Cim. L. 847, 848.
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Reasoning by analogy is not applied to things which are almost identical;
such reasoning is applied only when similarities are limited in number
and it is admitted that significant differences also exist.
Analogical reasoning in law means something quite different from
this. Indeed, the use of the term "legal analogy" is misleading and
obscures its differences from the doctrine of extensive interpretation.
For under the theory of this doctrine, it being granted that statute or
rule R correctly applies to the X situation, the Y situation is subsumed
under R by logical analogy if Y resembles X in a number of particulars
which outweigh known important differences. Thus, under extensive
interpretation the same rule is applied to both situations. Legal analogy
applies only where the differences are so important as to make improper
the subsumption of X and Y under the same rule. Hence, "judicial
legislation" more truly describes what is involved in so-called legal
analogy. Offense Y, though "sufficiently" different from offense X
so as not to be subsumable under R, does have important characteristics
in common with X. Because of these, it is thought that Y should be
punishable.
It is debatable whether, and to what extent, the above distinction be-
tween analogy and extensive interpretation is operative in the judicial
process, especially at the periphery of facts and symbols. One's judg-
ment of the value of the distinction will turn upon opinions held regard-
ing the role of the concept in the actual mental process, including the
possible indirect effects of the distinction as a general determinant of
judicial attitude. Certainly the common assumption in debate on nulla
poewt, as to its importance in the judicial process, is clear. XVhen, ho,--
ever, basic theories regarding adjudication are under fire, it seems super-
fluous to consider the niceties of the problem. But we may note some of
the implications that lie near the surface.
No two cases are identical; yet all cases have some common character-
istic. Upon the level of generality selected for the criteria of likeness
or dissimilarity depends the outcome. Hence it is clear that there are no
formal limits which the analogical method cannot reach. Also, just as
every similarity in two factual situations enhances the analogy, so dif-
ferences, as they mount, diminish it. Any two situations, facts or events
have some similarities, some differences. How can one decide which
preponderates? It necessarily follows, also, that there is an inevitable
competition between analogies. A new situation has some characteristics
in common with those admittedly included under Statute A; but other
characteristics are like those admittedly included under Statute B. Which
statute shall be the basis of the new rule? With a multitude of statutes
that are quite alike in principle, it is fallacious to assume that any one
must necessarily be closer to the act in question than any other. A fact-
situation has some characteristics of situations admittedly included under
19371
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a statute, and some of other situations which were admittedly, perhaps
even specifically, excluded from the statute. Which principle, if any,
applies ?
To some degree these difficulties apply to extensive interpretation as
well as to analogy. But extensive interpretation is limited by the broadest
actual denotation which the words symbolize. The standard is an objec-
tive one and may be contrasted with the derivation of factual referents
resulting from imaginative expansion of a statute into an all-embracing
"principle." Back of extensive interpretation are the language institution
and a long body of experience which apply some check on the process
of identifying fact-situations. Beyond some point, words used as sym-
bols, not principles, cannot be persuasively stretched, situations cannot
be identified. Legal analogy, however, is a break from the meaning of
words however stretched. But how much of a break is permitted? Where
is there a body of experience with legal analogy, i.e., judicial legislation,
that can exert a restraining effect upon its application? The only possible
limits may arise from the practices of judges representative of a com-
mon culture -practices that might conceivably, over a period of time,
fix some general framework for such legislation. But at the outset only
the vaguest of ideational factors can limit the pursuit of "principle."
Hence we arrive at a central distinction between the use of analogy
in England and the United States, and that recently proposed on the
continent. Anglo-American judges have made use of logical analogy 42
in the application of case law; and this process has generally been so
slow and detailed as to be hardly perceptible except to careful search.
It has for the most part -and here I speak of the growth of criminal
law over the centuries, not of particular leaps that undoubtedly can be
found -kept pace with change in the language institution itself. It has
amounted mostly to an all-but-unnoticed bringing-up-to-date of old terms
- so that, filled with new content, they refer more adequately to the
changed conditions. When American writers speak of expanding crim-
inal case law by analogy they do not mean deliberate law-making, avowed
and apparent to all; they are speaking of analogy in its more proper
logical connotation, i.e., extensive interpretation.
At the same time, it is perfectly clear that the traditional theory which
limits judicial authority to routine application of the legislative intent
is no longer tenable. Only infrequently are the intentions of a large
group of legislators determinable to any great extent. Rarer yet will
these intentions, or those of the majority, be uniform or specific. With
42. "It is characteristic that leading English and American treatises on statutory con-
struction do not even refer in their indices to the term 'analogy,' and the few cases in
which the terms -of a statute have received an extended application beyond their pos-
sible literal meaning, are clearly exceptional or anomalous." See Freund, Interpretalon
of Statutes, (1917) 65 U. OF PA. L. REv. 207, at 226, 227, 230.
[Vol. 47: 165
1937]
passage of time difficulties mount. Although conditions arise which the
legislators could not possibly have had in mind, the fiction of mere
application persists.
But rejection of traditional theories or dogmas of statutory interpre-
tation does not require or justify the conclusion that statutes play no
actual role whatever in the judicial process. Admittedly, the formal
statement of the rule persists absolutely unchanged. The social milieu
is not apt to be so utterly novel as to render completely unknowable at
least the general purpose of the statute. Mores persist; linguistic change
is slow. The court arrives at a judgment which will not jar the mores,
which, by and large, substantially effectuates words as understood at the
date of decision and which adheres to the rule as written.
Contrast these limitations of language, formal rule, and declared pur-
pose with the requirement that after all the above linguistic, social, and
psychological factors have played their parts, as they inevitably must,
if the fact-situation still falls outside the rule, it must nevertheless in
certain eventualities be punishable.43
Considered in the abstract, a persuasive argument can be made to sup-
port the deliberate and constant use of legislative powers by the courts
in disregard of the certainty of existing law. But only by analysis of
specific aspects of the problem in the light of actual conditions can valid
judgment result. The problem of division of labor between legislature
and judiciary concerns partly questions of efficiency, partly political and
ethical values. To this issue we shall shortly recur.
On the technical side of the question, it is apparent from decisions of
the Reichsgericht, which still includes judges of the older regime, that
analogy offers the magistrate an opportunity to escape the labor of dili-
gent research and study of the penal code by easy resort to "principle"
and "sound feelings of the people." It is equally clear that these judges
have extended analogy to areas of immorality or misconduct which the
legislature intended to leave unpunished.44 But it is especially significant
43. The German Act of June 28, 1935, provides: "Any person who commits an
act which the law declares to be punishable or which is deserving of penalty according
to the fundamental conceptions of a penal law and sound popular feeling, shall be pun-
ished. If there is no penal law directly covering an act it shall be punished under the
law of which the fundamental conception applies most nearly to the said act." Com-
pare Holmes, J., in McBoyle v. U. S., 283 U. S. 25, at 27 (1931), citing United States
v. Bhagat Singh Thind, 261 U. S. 204, at 209 (1923).
It is admitted that the German judge had been freed from narrow interpretation for
more than a decade prior to 1935. See DAM, SPECIAL REroar rnort TE INTEnNATIONAL
CoNGREss oF Co.PARATn LAv at 3, 4. Hence, extensive interpretation operated in
Germany prior to and at the time of the Act of June, 1935 which abolished inlla pocna.
This act, to have meaning, must obviously be understood to go beyond extensive inter-
pretation.
44. E.g., incest although the act was not consummated; homosexuality by women;
acts criminal within the jurisdiction, but committed outside the jurisdiction when they
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that analogy has apparently been little resorted to in Germany despite the
Act of June 28, 1935 "' l- due, to some extent, perhaps, to the Reichs-
gericht's reversal of the first cases to be appealed. If the power is so
little used, then obviously analogy does not serve its avowed purpose.
The penal laws in their multiplicity apparently do not contain the wide
gaps that were declared to exist.
"Substantial justice" does not suffer from lack of laws. On the con-
trary, modern penal law suffers from superfluity, not paucity of statutes.
By comparison with lack of detection, lack of complaint, and lack of
knowledge of criminality, failure to punish the guilty, resulting from
inadequacy of the penal code, must constitute an almost trivial defect,
although it is true the effect of analogizing by petty magistrates in cases
that are not appealable is unknown. Aside from the possibility of such
magisterial zeal, the injunction to employ analogy has effect, if anywhere,
in the formation of a repressive attitude that must tell not only in the in-
terpretation of laws but in the finding of facts as well. 40 This indication
is strengthened by the fact that the judge is not permitted to nullify any
existing penal law even though the sound feelings of the people are in-
different or even hostile to it. There is no injunction to allow the morally
innocent to escape; only the command to widen the net of punishability.
The supporting theme runs in terms of society versus the criminal4'
- although elsewhere the traditional view of the individual as outside
of or opposed to the Community is vigorously rejected. If what people
thought Lombroso said were only true! If the criminal actually stood
apart, marked and labeled like the leper, there might be justification for
reversion to the simplicity of primitive justice. But, in the light of known
facts, this view is fantastic in its unreality. The supposition is that "the
criminal" is not only perfectly well known but that he is known in ad-
vance of trial. That the criminal is a unique, atavistic being, recognizable
on sight, is a bias deeply rooted in the public mind, which only rational,
deliberate analysis can overcome; such an analysis is sought to be at-
tained by law, i.c., by determined abeyance of decision until a prescribed
process of careful deliberation shall have been concluded. As to petty
infractions, it is absurd to speak of criminals in the popular sense. Yet
analogy is applied to these offenses upon an indiscriminate "State versus
evil individual" thesis. As to serious wrongs which arouse moral indig-
nation, one may depend upon judges the world over to extend inter-
pretation in these instances as far as is permissible; very rarely, indeed,
were not criminal. See Frandurter Zeitung, June 24, 1936; R. G. 27/3/36 Deutsche
Justiz, 1936, 774; R. G. 18/2/36, Deutsche Justiz, 1936, 609.
45. The Act is set forth in note 43, supra.
46. See BaccARIA, ESSAY ON CRIMES AND PuNISHMENTS (1770) 14, 15; MoNums-
QuIEU, SPIrr OF LAWS (1748) Bk. XI, Ch. VI.
47. See Radin, Enemies of Society (1936) 27 J. CRIM. L. 328.
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does a modern penal code lack sufficient instrumentalities - certainly not
as regards major wrongs. An excessive judicial conservatism may for
a time allow a few malefactors to escape; that is the price paid for
the larger benefits conferred. But the legislature soon intervenes where
it becomes necessary.
Yet it would be somewhat delusive to imagine that the Classical con-
ception of the judicial function persists. Especially as regards interpre-
tation of statutes have there been profound changes; but it is difficult
to generalize about these. The rule of strict construction of penal statutes
played a peculiar and important role in eighteenth century England when
a humanitarian ideology propagated by Beccaria, Romilly, Howard, Bux-
ton and others rose against a severe and undiscriminating written law.
Statutes perfectly clear in their meaning were distorted to exclude numer-
ous situations that came before the courts. "Strict" construction was
any construction, however fantastic, that saved the offender from the
capital penalty. This movement and its significance with reference to
the strict interpretation of penal statutes I have discussed elsewhere at
length.4 So far as generalization here makes any sense, it may be said
that in most cases where the weight of precedent is not great English
and American courts now construe penal statutes with a view to carry-
ing out the legislative intention. Where the statute is clear, words are
given normal meanings; the rules of grammar are not strained.
Difficulties arise where ambiguities exist -and that, by general agree-
ment, is the point where india poena is now relevant. To comprehend
the significance of the jurisprudence interpreting penal statutes requires
techniques and theories which have hardly yet been applied; certain it is
that little can be learned simply from the language of the courts or of
the traditional treatises. Only the most tentative generalizations may,
therefore, be hazarded as to American cases: where the ambiguity ap-
plies to a procedural or formal matter, there seems to be a tendency
to resolve the uncertainty against the accused. This tendency seems
especially noticeable when the crime is serious and public opinion is
aroused. Elsewhere, strict construction, in the sense of giving the accused
the benefit of doubt, persists. 9 The problem needs complete reformula-
tion and analysis which cannot be undertaken here."o
But manifest are the hazards of officially instructing judges, especially
minor magistrates who can be removed at will by the political authorities,
48. HALL, THEFt, LAW AND Soci'rY (1935) especially Ch. 3.
49. Roux, op. cit. supra note 1, at 84; 1 GAPRAuD, op. cit. sutra note 1, at art. 146,
p. 303; Rex v. Halliday, [1917] A. C. 260, at 274.
50. One need is to fix the meanings of the terms "strict" and "liberal.' The extant
literature confuses even the primary distinctions between (1) construction favorable
to or unfavorable to the accused, and (2) construction concerned with objective mean-
ings of words.
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that they must hold facts clearly outside a statute to be punishable, and
that they must do so by reference to what they imagine to be the attitude
or "feelings of the people." Even if this power were confined to the
major courts, it would still be fraught with many difficulties, e.g., official
abuses, indifference, irrelevance or uncertainty of public morals, changing
attitudes, ethical invalidity of public standards in many regards, and occa-
sional public hostility to certain laws or public admiration for certain
offenders. Finally, even if many of the premises and objectives under-
lying advocacy of the use of analogy are accepted, there remains the
important question whether modernized legislation is not the sounder
method.
Failure to comprehend the more complex methods by which guarantees
against governmental abuses are provided by Anglo-American law has
caused certain European criminologists to assert recently, in defense of
their innovations, that ulla poena does not exist in England or America.
In a sense this may be a narrow, literal truth, but as intended by these
writers, it is certainly a substantial error."" The propositions, nullum
crimen sine lege, midla poena sine lege, as they developed on the continent
at the end of the eighteenth century and as they are there understood,
premise inclusive penal codification. In a few American states, which
have substituted penal codes or collections of statutes for the common
law of crimes, a somewhat generally accurate parallel can be drawn; the
qualifications would run along lines suggested by distinctive techniques
of adjudication and by the differences resulting from reference to a wide
net-work of precedent utilized to interpret words in a penal code. In
perhaps a majority of American states, as in England, despite the large
and constantly increasing volume of statutes, there exists a residuum of
common law which makes nulla poena irrelevant in its specific continental
sense; it certainly complicates even broad comparison.
It is not difficult, however, to find some approximation in English legal
history to contemporary continental abandonment of nulla poena. The
ancient prerogative of the Crown exercised in the issuance of numerous
decrees, the powers of the Council, the decisions of the judges during some
centuries of creative building of the common law -all are suggestive.
For almost two hundred years the Court of Star Chamber exercised a
wide jurisdiction over crimes, and "it punisheth errors creeping into the
Commonwealth, which otherwise might prove dangerous and infectious
diseases . . . although no positive law or continued custom of common
51. See Marshall, C. J., in United States v. Wiltberger, 5 Wheat. 76, 96 (U. S. 1820) :
"It would be dangerous, indeed, to carry the principle, that a case which is within the
reason or mischief of a statute, is within its provisions, so far as to punish a crime
not enumerated in the statute, because it is of equal atrocity, or of a kindred character,
with those which are enumerated." Compare note 43, supra.
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law giveth warrant to it." 52 Despite subsequent condemnation of the Star
Chamber, the Court was really a popular tribunal. But it was abolished
in 1641. Since then law, in its narrow connotation, has been the avowed
single authority. Close adherence to precedent, especially in England, has
strengthened that authority. But there has been one striking exception,
perhaps not unrelated to the abolition of the Star Chamber, and that has
to do with misdemeanors 3 In recent years it has generally been forgotten
that from 1660 to 1860, the courts, without any specific precedent, fre-
quently punished conduct which was contra bonos mores, or which openly
outraged public decency,54 or which was subsumable under some similar
generalization; and there are scattered instances of the courts having con-
tinued this practice after 1860.'s
The shock produced by Rex v. Alanley 0 in 1933 indicates how rarely
courts in England have exercised this discretionary power in recent years,
and how firmly the tradition of law is there established. Probably the
larger part of English criminal law is now statutory, and penal statutes
have typically been rather narrow and specific. It is clear that such statutes
are not extended by analogy; even where acts fall within the words of a
statute they will not be held punishable unless they are also within the
spirit, not of "the people," but of the statute as fixed by common under-
standing of the language. 7
Hence, even as to misdemeanors generally, it cannot be said that there
is very great similarity between the functioning of the English judge and
recent continental innovations regarding analogy, which, it must be re-
membered, apply to all crimes. And in analyzing the infinitely more diffi-
cult problem of the processes employed by Anglo-American judges in
transforming the law, one must not confuse the deliberate invention of
new rules with the relatively unconscious subsumption of unanticipated or
52. Hudson, quoted in 1 HoLDswoRTH, HISTORY OF ENGasH LAw (Sth ed. 1935)
504.
53. And, of course, as regards juvenile delinquency.
54. See 4 BLACKSTlONE, COM.MENTARIES 65; HAWrKINS, PLEAS OF THE CXowN (8th
ed. 1824) c. 5, § 4; 1 EAST, PLEAS OF THE CROWN (1716) cc. 1, 3, 4.
55. Reg. v. Stephenson, 13 Q. B. D. 331 (1884); see STvPnE., A DIGEST OF TIM
Cxui rAL LAw (1878) 106, 107.
56. Defendant falsely stated she had been robbed, thus causing police officers to
make an investigation to discover the offender. She was convicted -of effecting "a public
mischief." Rex v. Manley, [1933] 1 K. B. 529. And see Stallybrass, Public Mischief
(1933) 49 L. Q. Rav. 183; Jackson, Common Law Misdcncanors (1937) 9 CA=. L. J.
193.
57. See notes 18 and 51, supra; THE GAUNTL.Er, 4 C. P. 184 (1872) ; Farell, L. J.
in Baylis v. Bishop of London, [1913] 1 Ch. 127, 137; Scrutton, L. J. in Hartnett v.
Fisher, [1927] 1 K. B. 402, 424 ("This court sits to administer the law; not to make
new law if there are cases not provided for") ; ALLEN, op. cit. mtpra note 37, at 184-
185, for several examples where, though judges heartily disapproved of a rule of law,
they felt themselves "powerless to change the rule."
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even unintended sets of facts under old prescriptions -a process found
in both code and common law adjudication, and a phenomenon inseparable
from the endless interaction of a growing language and changing socio-
economic institutions. 8
At first glance, it might appear that under such generalties as contra
bonos mores, "outrage to public decency", or "injury to public morals",
there is an almost unlimited discretion. 9 No doubt, the possibilities for
such discretion do exist; no doubt at various periods in both English and
American history these powers were widely used. But an examination
of cases decided in recent years indicates that a strong legal tradition
imposes sharp limitations on the operation of such statutes. 60
There are other potent, though more subtle, forces affecting Anglo-
American jurisprudence than the principle of stare decisis rigorously
applied. They operate to effectuate the ends which are sought on the
continent through nulla poena sine lege. It is only necessary to recall
that European scholars of the eighteenth century, especially French, looked
to England as the home of political liberty; and that thence a number
of forms of English criminal procedure, along with related political and
constitutional guarantees, made their way into continental countries. A
wide array of ethical-political principles incorporated into fundamental
law, and made warp and woof of popular and official tradition over a
period of centuries-these provide nicer and, no doubt, more effective
guarantees of individual security and freedom from arbitrary penaliza-
tion than can result from any formal expression of nulla poena which is
isolated from actual administration of law.
58. See HALL, 10c. cit. supra note 48.
59. See Schinnerer, Analogie und Rechtsschopfung (1936) 55 ZEITSCHRIF ,Un
STRAFRECHTSWISSENSCHAFT, Heft 6, at 771; DAUM, SPECIAL REPORT FOR THE INTEnNA-
TIONAL CONGRESS OF COMPARATIVE LAW (1937).
60. See Sec. 675 (present sec. 43) of the New York Penal Code.. There are, ob-
viously, two all-important limitations on the statute: it is confined to misdemeanors;
and the vast majority of misdemeanors are specifically described in the Code. Finally,
as to the relatively small area provided for by See. 43, the judges have imposed numerous
restrictions. See People v. Baylinson, 211 App. Div. 40, 43, 206 N. Y. Supp. 804, 807
(1st Dep't 1924); People v. Tylkoff, 212 N. Y. 197, 105 N. E. 835 (1914); People v.
Burke, 243 App. Div. 83, 84, 276 N. Y. Supp. 402, 404 (1st Dep't 1934), aff'd without
opinion, 267 N. Y. 571, 196 N. E. 585 (1935); People v. Ward, 148 Misc. 94, 96, 266
N. Y. Supp. 466, 468 (Ct. Sar. 1933); In re Farley, 143 N. Y. Supp. 305 (Sup. Ct.
1913) ; People v. Helmes, 144 Misc. 695, 259 N. Y. Supp. 911 (Ct. Chen. 1932).
Cases involving other parts of Section 43 (675) Penal Law include: People v.
Most, 171 N. Y. 423, 430, 64 N. E. 175, 178 (1902); People v. Nesin, 179 App. Div.
869, 167 N. Y. Supp. 49 (2d Dep't 1917); People v. Heinlein, 172 N. Y. Supp. 669
(Ct. West. 1918).
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IV. RPECHSSTAAT
Upon an analysis somewhat similar to that presented above, the
Permanent Court of International Justice held that application of the
German law of June 28, 1935 1 to Danzig was in violation of the require-
ment that the government of the city be by rule of law (Rechsstaat).'
The rationale of the decision is clear. In a formal sense, however, "law"
may be said to be simply the will of the State; under this generalization
whatever the State's officials do in pursuance of the declared will of the
State is "legal". There is no logical reason why the State's commands
must be specific. Hence, with perfect consistency one may contend that
the German law is no violation of Rechsstaat; and, indeed, the like posi-
tion may be taken as regards simply one all-inclusive command, for
example, punish "socially dangerous" conduct.
But it is perfectly clear that "Rechsstaat" is something more than an
abstraction to which any nebulous interpretation can be applied. Its
meaning can be ascertained only by reference to its actual, historical
context. This meaning has been generally expressed as limitation upon
the application of force by government, such limitation to be effected
by prescription and application of specific rules. Hence the direct object
of Rechsstaat is to confine discretion.'
It is also apparent that some circumstances, or our knowledge of them,
are of such an intrinsically general nature that it is impossible to define
them specifically.' And, it is axiomatic that no scheme of legal admin-
istration can escape the uncertainties imposed by the imperfections of
human nature. Some may seek an escape from this rather disconcerting
reality by a barrage at an alleged belief in a mechanically certain legal
apparatus.6 5 Recognition of the maximum limits of certainty in the
judicial process may be the first step towards enlightenment. But the
major problem is the discovery of the particular spheres of relative cer-
61. See note 43, supra.
62. Advisory Opinion of Dec. 4, 1935, Series A/B-No. 65. The vote was 9 to 3, the
dissenting judges being Polish, Italian and Japanese-the last only placing his dissent
on divergence from the view that the law was inconsistent with Reclssaal.
63. See Permanent Court of International Justice, Series A/B. Judgments, Orders
and Advisory Opinions, No. 65, Dec. 4, 1935, pp. 53, 56.
64. This distinction is not recognized by those who, on the basis of an occasional
necessarily very general statute, argue that analogy restricts more 'rigorously than does
interpretation. If such a result is reached, it is not because analogy is restrictive, but
because legal tradition persists and is especially suspicious of analogy.
65. To those who hold that rules of law are of little consequence in the judicial
process, Rechsslaat is sheer fiction. This view can be understood as a reaction from
an other-worldly philosophy that contemplates the legal rule only as ideal. But there is
a sound psychological approach to the problem of the concept as reality. Instead of
dogmatic denials of the existence and effectiveness of legal concepts, a scientific posi-
tion would hold conclusions in abeyance, while research proceeded open-mindedly.
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tainty and uncertainty. It is more than a fair hypothesis that throughout
the entire body of the law numerous specific concepts abound and elicit
reasonably uniform responses in their application, though the complete
results depend not only upon the legal rules but also upon institutional
non-legal behavior and upon common ideas and standards born of recur-
rent similar experience in a particular culture. Rechsstaat can mean no
more than attainment of the maximum possible certainty through imple-
mentation of specific rules. It means no less.
In light of the position that code and statute occupy in continental
law, the judgment of scholars that nullum crimen, nulla poena sine lege
constitute the essence of Rechsstaat, in its penal aspect, was quite un-
challenged until two years ago. 66 Law, to be sure, may be viewed solely
as a means to the attainment of social purposes. As a mere instrument
there is no reason why it should be surrounded by an aura of inviola-
bility; on the contrary there is every reason for modification, repeal and
manipulation as occasion requires.
But law has also been so long and so closely identified with uniformity,
equality, order, fairness and stability that it is in fact impossible to
separate it from these universal ideas and ideals. Law in its operation
is both the immediate observable representation of these ideas and their
abstract symbolization. As such, law is an end in itself, one of the great
values of civilization, and for the most part, the only concretely manifest
side of an ideal justice. Reclsstaat is a significant aspect of this value,
and it is little wonder that its preservation is warmly espoused."
I
V. TREATMENT OF OFFENDERS
Nuiluin crimen sine lege was never literally followed. As regards
juveniles, vagabonds, mendicants, persons without visible means of sup-
port, and others, only a distortion of words can deduce a merely formal
requirement that there be an act (crimen). There is a long tradition
regarding vagabonds and mendicants in English law; hardly ever has
treatment of them and of other special classes accorded with otherwise
rigorous insistence upon specific definition of criminality. 8 Again, as
66. See Gerland, Artikel mx6 (Nipperday) DIE GRUNDRECHTE UND GRUNDPFLICUITEN
DER REICHSVERFASSUNG (1929) at 368. Compare Gerland, The German Draft Penal
Code and Its Place in the History of Penal Law, 11 J. CouP. LEG. & INT. LAW (3rd
Series, 1929) at 21, 25, 30 with Gerland, Neues Strafrecht, DEUTSCHE JURiSTEN-ZEm-
TUNG (1933) 857, at 860.
67. See McIlwain, Government by Law (1936) 14 FOR. AFFAIRS 185.
68. As regards some of these classes it will be noted that they have not been re-
garded as really criminal. Hence, abandonment of nullum crimell (especially as to
juveniles) has meant individualized and humane treatment. Similar reasons urge like
treatment of other classes, e.g., drug addicts, and prostitutes.
My proposal to extend like treatment to petty thieves [THEFT, LAW AND Soc=rY
(1935) Ch. 7] has been criticized on the one hand because it might make possible long
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regards certain other offenses such as acts against good morals, it is
exceedingly difficult, if not impossible, to frame specific definitions; be-
sides, a long legal tradition together with restriction of such inclusive
statutes to minor offenses would make insistence upon radium crimen
impracticable in this particular. With reference to political offenses, the
matter is quite a different one ;O9 there is no doubt as to the opposing
views of liberalism to autocracy regarding that. Apart from the cases
of special classes of persons, and offenses requiring inherently necessary
vague definition, itullion crimnen has persisted in most liberal states.
As to indla poena sine lege in its reference to punishment, however,
there has been very considerable departure from classical views. Inde-
terminate sentence, probation, suspended sentence, nominal sentence,
waiver of felonies on pleas to misdemeanors, compromise, modified sen-
tence, "good time" laws, parole, and pardon have almost completely
transformed eighteenth century law and penological ideas."0
On first impression, one might believe that these departures from nl-
lum crinen, india poena suggest the proper objective for our times,
which might be expressed as retention of iheliun crimen and abandon-
ment of ilndla poena. That solution is, however, quite questionable. The
centering of recent criminologists on the personality of the offender has
as its corollary the complete abandonment of ailum crimen.
Even more cogent a reason for questioning the proposal that indium
crimen be retained and indla poena be abandoned is that the tvo rules
are inextricably interwoven. Complete abandonment of nudla poena means
complete individualization of punishment. In effect the guarantee has
vanished almost entirely, if anything can be done to any convicted
person. It might be rare indeed that the murderer with political con-
nections would escape serious punishment while the impotent petty thief
incarceration of petty offenders. This criticism is irrelevant to the proposal actually
made, for the text makes it quite clear that (1) existing maximum sentences were ac-
cepted as the upper limits of incarceration; and, more than that (2) the purpose was
to discover a method of eliminating punishment entirely so far as many of these petty
offenders were concerned. Obviously, the nature of treatment is as important as i6
duration. Other criticism of the proposal was that it was too restricted. As to this,
aside from referring to this paper generally, and to purposes of the criminal law other
than rehabilitative ones, all that can be said here in addition is that the major objective
was to formulate a general theory regarding individualization, rather than to advance a
particular reform.
69. "He who in order to weaken the spirit of resistance of the population, spreads
in time of war or when war is imminent such rumors as may weaken this spirit is pun-
ishable by imprisonment." [up to 15 years]. PoLIsH CR. CODE, Sec. 104.
70. See, e.g., GEam=, CRIMINAL AcrxoNs IN THE COMMON PLEAS COURTS OF OHIO
(1936) 292. California, except for two or three instances where inimutim sentences are
fixed by statute, requires the judge to impose an entirely indeterminate sentence. CAL.
PENAL CODE (Deering, 1937), Sec. 1168; Ex porte Lee, 177 Cal. 690, 171 Pac. 959 (1918) ;
A Digest of Indeterminate Sentence Laws and Parole Rules (1928) 18 J. Car,. L. 580.
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languished in jail, or that for any reason petty offenders were the more
severely punished. But those extreme cases must be comprehended in
any program that purports to supply valid answers to the perplexing
problems that are involved. The current issues can be indicated most
briefly by reference to demands being made in the United States, as
elsewhere, for sentencing boards together with complete elimination of
prescribed penalties. The judge, it is argued, should be confined entirely
to the conduct of the trial; his participation should end when a verdict
is reached. Sentences, we are informed, should be wholly indeterminate;
treatment, if any is necessary, should be prescribed by an administra-
tive board of experts who have opportunity to study the offender and
knowledge concerning rehabilitation. As noted, the argument occasionally
extends to advocacy of entire elimination of any criminal act. Presum-
ably, the "anti-social" person will in some sort of proceeding be declared
"dangerous" and placed in the hands of the sentencing tribunal. Not
punishment but only measures of "social defense" are to be applied."
This argument and rationalization are familiar as representative of the
Positivist School. 2 But they have been given a different and insidious
emphasis by continental Neo-Positivists who accept the strictures of the
older Positivism on law as a limitation on official conduct but with
even greater zest reject the humanitarianism which accompanied that de-
velopment. 3 It is impossible to ignore the various purposes implicit in
a particular system of criminal law and its administration as well as actual
ability to attain those purposes which should be sought; in this field,
if any, it is necessary to insist that theory have some fair correspondence
to fact. And in all this, it must be remembered that in the last analysis
nulla poena represents the most cherished of all the values involved in the
administration of the criminal law. What is actually done is the ulti-
mate basis for judgment. What is done to the criminal is a very real
71. "... par une nouvelle Ecole . . . l'interpritation dolt chercher le mimre but
que la peine, c'est-d-dire ti mieux assurer le difense social . . . I1 est difficile de voir
dans cette tendance ws progrbs, car elle West qu'un retour, pent-itre inconscient, a I'arbi-
traire des peines, si dangereux pour la liberti individuelle." VIDAL, Cours DE DR0IT
CRIMINEL (1916), at 78-9; see also Cornil, La Mestre de Suret Envisagyie Objectllve-
vient (1929) DROIT PENAL Er CRIINOLOGIE, 825.
72. De la Morandiere observes acutely (op. cit. supra note 2, at 280) that Ferri
would make all criminals responsible, e.g., a person who was insane when he committed
a crime is not now punished. But such a person, if "socially dangerous", would under
positivist ideas be incarcerated. The issues are debatable except that it seems clear that
the very general concepts of "insanity" and "mental disease" would be supplanted by
the much more nebulous concept, "social danger." It also seems clear that until the
nature of incarceration and of treatment change radically, it is sophistry to distinguish
"social defense" from punishment. Even as to juveniles in Belgium, Racine states that
they almost invariably write letters pleading to be released. See SPEcrAL REPORT To
INTERNATIONAL CONGRESS OF Comsp. LAW (1937).
73. See Cantor, op. cit. supra note 40, at 89.
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index to the degree of civilization. Hence, whatever shortcomings the
Classicists had, it is to their abiding credit that they said not only
millum crimen sine lege, but much more, that they said indla poena sine
lege.
Criminologists generally are prone to assume that the discretion exer-
cised by an administrative board will be "wise and good"; it will not be
arbitrary and severe like judicial discretion in the ancien righne. Un-
fortunately, history records other eventualities -and in places where
knowledge and social altruism reached the highest peaks in human devel-
opment. What, indeed, is wise discretion? How does it differ from
official arbitrariness? Until these questions can be answered correctly
and with some degree of certainty, the issues between Classicists and
Positivists remain unresolved.
Yet it is impossible in the abstract to condemn or to praise abandon-
ment of nulla poena as regards treatment of criminals. It all depends.
It depends upon the premises made regarding the purposes of the crim-
inal law and its administration, and even more upon the actual facts
which condition objectives and may radically modify otherwise splendid
purposes. Are wise judges available and in sufficient number? Is
"treatment" really treatment, or does that, as well as the equally euphem-
istic "social defense," really mean punishment, perhaps of a repressive
sort that harks back to the darkest chapters in human history? If it be
assumed that one is humane and is seriously searching for truth, the
question remains, is there really a body of knowledge which permits dis-
covery of socially dangerous persons in advance of their criminal behavior
or that assures humane and sound treatment of offenders? Or are the
social disciplines, at best, so uncertain in their verities and so difficult
to comprehend that only the exceptional scholar can master them? These
are the issues that should check propaganda and guide sound theory.
These are the actualities that should form the basis for decision as to
whether the present need may not be for improvement of administration
in its already far-flung field rather than further abandonment of la,:.
VI. POLITICAL AND PHI.LOSOPHICAL CONSIDERATIONS
In its eighteenth century conteict niulla poena meant limitation upon
government and consequent protection for the individual. That meaning
has persisted. Yet, when one finds that Denmark introduced analogy a
few years ago, that Italy in her 1930 Code reaffirmed midla poena in-
cluding non-retroactivity, and when we note that Poland did likewise,
that Germany has departed from the rule, and that Russia discarded it
entirely in 1926, we must conclude that no facile identification of sulla
poena with a particular type of government will suffice. It would, how-
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ever, be much more fallacious to assume that political forces are not
involved.
In Germany, the judge had been freed from "slavish adherence to the
statute" long before 1935,4 and this had been influenced by overpowering
post-war economic changes. Inflation and bankruptcy coincided with
contracts calling for payment in gold and providing for creditors' reme-
dies which, if pursued, would have brought chaos. Legal classicism,
already condemned by philosophy, gave way before an infusion of equit-
able principles that overrode the rules of law. 5 The judge, applying
the penal law under pressure of a strongly centralized government, itself
the creature of economic and moral collapse, found ready-made the work
of Liszt and his followers; and the fact that scientific criminology was
constructed in a liberal age did not make it any the less instrumental in
carrying out the dictates of authoritarian government. The law of June,
1935 was but one of numerous legal and constitutional changes that
characterize the new regime. Such legal change becomes comprehensible
only when placed in the whole context of economic conditions and politi-
cal ideology.1"
The new Italian Code of 1930 was adopted some years after the Fascist
Revolution. Stability of government joined a strong legalist tradition.
Again, in Italy a highly developed Natural Law philosophy may, in some
spheres and to some extent, have retarded the full sweep of counter-
vailing views.17  The setting up of special tribunals to hear political
offenses in disregard of constitutional law,"8 and the very broad definition
of crimes, 79 along with the turning over of the chief interests of the
74. The 1927 draft of a German Penal Code had already incorporated many of the
views of the positivist school. See Gerland, op. cit. supra note 66, at 28 if.
75. See 107 DECISIONS OF THE R. G., CIvIL CASES 87 (November 28, 1923).
76. Such an analysis would need to be supplemented, and could be most interestingly,
by a study of the personalities of those largely responsible for radical legal change. As
to Roland Freisler, credited with a major role in the departure from nulla poena, see
61 Juristische Wochenschrift (1932) 2203. His career includes: Bolshevik official in
Russia, censure by Bar Associations, and a series of fines in criminal courts, chiefly
for slander. Of quite another order is the complete change of position among intellectuals
after a revolution. No better example can be had than that of the eminent Prof. Gerland.
See note 66, supra. Finally, account would need to be taken of those who are not won
over by the revolutionary ideology. Several of these are to be found in the Rcichsgericht,
and their persistent adherence to the older legal tradition may be seen from their refusal
to affirm convictions by analogy. E.g., R. G. 27/3/36 D. J. 1936, 774, and R. G. 18/2/36,
D. J. 1936, 609.
77. See HAINES, THE REVIVAL OF NATURAL LAW CONCEPTS (1930) 279, if. And as
to recent natural law in Germany, id. at 246, 247.
78. See Cantor, The Fascist Political Prisoners (1936) 27 J. Cpan. L. 169.
79. E.g., Art. 282: "Whoever commits an offense against the honor or prestige of
the Head of Government shall be punished with penal servitude from one to five years."
See also note 69, supra.
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state to administrative boards no doubt facilitated retention of traditional
law in the ordinary run of offenses.8 1
The German Act of June, 1935 is conservative by cumparison with
the Russian Penal Code of 1926. Here all "socially dangerous" be-
havior is punishable, and the standards of dangerousness are the objec-
tives of the Revolution. Yet there has been a long series of significant
changes in Soviet law, making it difficult to generalize with reference
to the entire period of its operation. In the first instance, one may
inquire to what extent Russian views on law represent a phase of revo-
lutionary propaganda rather than normal viewpoints. Lenin announced
that the Communist Dictatorship is "a dictatorship untrammelled by any
law, an absolute rule, a power that is based directly on violence" . . .s1
This enunciates the Marxist attack upon law as an instrument of the
ruling class. Hence, a classless society will have no need of it.L 2 Under
some such broad formula as "socially dangerous" the judge will function
to attain and preserve the objects of the Revolution. Yet Lenin himself
retreated from this theoretical position. The fourteenth Congress of
the Communist Party demanded a return to legality.' Others argued
that non-legality was bad for the peasants. The Code of Criminal Pro-
cedure, Article 5, contained guarantees against illegal arrest, although
the special police were not hampered by judicial review. And the new
Soviet Constitution purports to introduce a Bill of Rights of far-reaching
effect. Even as regards treatment of juveniles, the Russians have aban-
doned their former position and now resort to admittedly punitive
measures.
84
During revolution, law, especially criminal law, is used as a party
weapon. But law soon transcends the transitory revolutionary conditions,
and copes with people and situations that cannot be treated by simple
reference to revolutionary ideals. Non-political situations affecting es-
pecially the person and the family give rise to conflict; quite apart from
the reaches of political doctrine, specific issues may be decided by la,
or arbitrarily. Both the uniformity and fairness that universally char-
acterize law and the security which its administration instills should
recommend themselves to autocratic states no less than to democracies.
Indeed, there is even greater reason why an authoritarian state should
be a RecIhsstaat; this is a point that does not escape Italian and Hun-
80. See generally Steiner, The Fascist Conception of Lazu (1936) 36 Car- L Rzv.
1267.
81. Quoted in Mirkine-Guetzivitch, The Public Law System of the Sovietic Dicta-
torship, (3rd Series 1930) 12 J. Comsp. LEG. & INT. L. 248, at 230.
82. See Dobrin, Soviet Jurisprudence and Socialism (1936) 52 1. Q. REv. 02.
83. Mirkine-Guetz~vitch, op. cit. supra note 81, at 249.
84. See Berman, Juvenile Delinquency, the Family and the Court in the Soviet
Union (1937) 42 Am. J. Soc. 682.
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garian commentators, for example, in their arguments for retention of
iulla poena.85
Several common traits characterize these revolutionary movements in
authoritarian states. Special police are exempt from legal constraint;
they arrest, try, execute, and exile without check by law or courts. Again,
appeal is limited. Special tribunals for the trial of political offenders
may be depended upon to effectuate the will of the government. Sweep-
ing abrogation of Constitutional guarantees limits the area of govern-
mental constraint; compared with the suspension of the Bill of Rights
in the Weimar Constitution, the abrogation of mulla poena seems a trifle.
To be added to the various factors noted above is the whole stream of
prevailing philosophic thought as interpreted by dominant leaders to
implement their political aims. Upon its particular conjunction with
these factors depends the significance of any rule of law.
Authoritarian political theory supports authority. Its attack upon
illa poena consists in stressing the paramount importance of the Com-
munity"0 in order to justify subordination of the individual. To these
are added special theories of leadership and of popular law. 81 The
Leader has a mystic power of divining the people's spirit and can best
formulate its will in laws. 8 Some legislation, to be sure, relating to
more or less complex aspects of life is not the reflection of the sound
feelings of the people. It must represent only the Leader's will. The
Leader's will, however, never clashes with the sound feelings of the
people.
That these views are largely articles of faith, not knowledge, seems
all-too-apparent. Rulers have made similar pretensions before, and phil-
osophy has often been their handmaiden. But the idealist view of the
State, even though combined with a psychological need for faith and
obedience, cannot obscure the fact that States act through governments
and governments through men- who, alas, are limited, all-too-human
beings.
But the difficulty with much of the current criticism of analogy is that
it is premised upon a dislike of actual results reached under authoritarian
government. The reasoning is backwards: dictatorship is an unmitigated
evil; it has abolished indla poena; therefore, abolition of nidla poena is.
necessarily improper. But one must consider Denmark and other liberal
85. See The Special Reports written by Professor Racz and Delitala for the Inter-
national Congress of Comparative Law, Hague (1937).
86. See notes 78, 80, smpra.
87. See MARx, GOVERNMENT IN THE Tnma RFICH (1936); ERMARTu, THE NEV,
GERMANY; NATIONAL SoCIALIST GOVERNMENT IN THEORY AND PRACTICE (1936).
88. RICHTER, 5 DEUTSCHES RECHT (1935) 365, translated in Marx, op. cit. supra
note 87, at 91.
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countries which have also departed, at least to some extent, from nultl
poena. If the treatment of offenders is humane and the administration
of criminal justice is wise, is not the greater freedom of the judge de-
sirable?
It is in the light of this latter argument that one can understand the
sweeping inroads of Positivism upon liberal government generally. That
the abolition of law took place first in the treatment of juveniles is all-
significant as an index of the motivation behind the movement for indi-
vidualization. But the possibilities of this movement are now apparent;
and it is understandable, too, why Liszt, von Hippel and Exner are
quoted by German criminalists today."2 For the abolition of nulla poena
provides a sieve through which can flow not only humanity and science
but also repression and stupidity. Dictatorship will not brook interfer-
ence by law (unless in particular instances the goal can be achieved none-
the-less) ; the wise and humane community seeks the freedom to utilize
its resources to aid the weak and the maladjusted. Only by careful study
of the actual results of the abandonment of law can one arrive at a
valid judgment. An occasional democracy like Denmark, wise beyond
most in social science and sympathetic to the unadjusted, tries to achieve
a fuller utilization of her altruism and skill. But the retention of nulla
poena by the vast majority of liberal sta-tes - indeed, the move to in-
tensify legality, as in Belgium with refertnce to juvenile delinquency" -
indicates that traditional political attitudes endure where they have taken
firm root.
Nothing is more superficial than to lay at the door of the present
German and Russian governments complete accountability for their cur-
rent law. The roots are deeply grounded; and, indeed, there is no more
fascinating or ironical page in intellectual history than their adoption
of a legal philosophy largely propagated by men who have since been
personally disowned, even exiled.
The major problems dealt with in the above discussion parallel the
moot issues of modern jurisprudence. Some further understanding of
89. See Matzke. Juristische WVochenschrift, 7 July. 1934; see also Klee, 1434. D J. Z_
641-643.
90. See the exceptionally well considered Special Report of Aim e Racine to the
International Congress of Comparative Law, Hague, 1937, p. 23, wherein is discussed
the insistence of a group of Belgium scholars and lawyers that the juvenile is entitled
to at least as much legal protection as the criminal. Racine concludes: "Notts tensons
qm'en cc qui les [dclinquants] conccrne, it font appliquer aussi strictement quc possible
la rbgle nullum crimen sine lege: ne pas consid&cr cornme vol de la part d'un enfant
cc qui n'est point 'vol pour un adndte; ne pas accorder [a correction tatc rnelle, si Fin-
conduite ou Pindiscipline ne revtrent un caractre de r'lle grazter. El eii reste tar ci
par Id un cas ou lintervention judiciaire paralte opportune, inais on lle ne tourrait sc
rMaliser qu'au inoycn d'une interpr~tation extensive, ce n'cst point une raison tour se
dipartir de la rbgle en question . . . Pareille incertitude doit itre &'tee aux enfants et
6 lcurs familles!' . . .
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these problems may result from thoughtful consideration of certain
far-reaching principles which underlie analyses of many legal problems.
From this more general point of view, the final answers given to the
question whether inulla poena should be maintained are based upon the
outcome of two fundamental considerations. As a matter of fact, is it
possible for human conduct, particularly that of judges, to be signifi-
cantly guided by concepts, i.e., legal rules? Secondly, what are the politi-
cal and social values of the answerer?
Until recently, these inquiries have been posed quite differently. Tra-
ditionally, the problem has been analyzed in terms of rules of law versus
discretion, of "justice with and without law", of equity versus law, and
so on- extending clearly back to Aristotle, and, no doubt, beyond.
Two apparently distinctive sets of conditions, two unique psychological
processes have been noted, described, and usually opposed: adjudication
according to prescribed rule, and adjudication without rule but according
to certain more or less intuitively apprehended ideas of justice- some-
times advanced as Equity or higher, i.e., Natural Law, or as Reason.
In recent years. adjudication by. law has been increasingly challenged,
both as a value and as a fact. The modern movement may conveniently
be dated from Jhering, 01 and its social and emotional impetus can be
suggested by noting that it coincided with Marxism."2 No later writer
has equalled Jhering's satire of a "heaven of concepts". But the anti-
conceptualism which he fostered has advanced far beyond his formula-
tion of the issues. The Free Law school of jurisprudence took up the
attack on "mechanical jurisprudence", derogatorily described as "slot-
machine" adjudication. It assumed a constructive position with refer-
ence to those areas of the private law whose further growth was not
determined by weighty precedent. Here the courts were to legislate
without hesitancy or disguise and - save for such an occasional voice
in France as Saleilles' - were to draw their premises not from the
suggestiveness of existing codes and rules, but from the needs of the
social problem93 confronting the judge. In the United States, Holmes
adopted this program to some extent as regards what he termed the
"interstitial areas" of the private law. Later, Mr. Justice Cardozo ap-
plied these views, elaborated into a more conscious social-utilitarianism,
to important segments of the judicial process. But judicial legislation
in those areas untouched by existing private law was not the last phase
of the Free Law movement. For in the United States, at least, a natural,
91. See JHEzNG, LAW AS A MEANS TO AN ENV (1913) 320.
92. Jhering, born in 1818, published DER ZwECIC iM RECIT in 2 volumes in 1877,
1883. Marx, born in 1818, published DAS KAPXTAL in 1867. Liszt, born in 1851, published
LEHRBUCH DES DEUTSCHEN STRAFREcHTS in 1881.
93. These needs are never viewed as ethical or cultural, but always as economic.
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if not welcome, offspring of this school is so-called Legal Realism, which,
in its extreme form, denies completely the efficacy of rules of law to
prevent or to determine any controversy. The implications of this posi-
tion are of overshadowing importance. For if rules are relatively incon-
sequential factors in governing the relations of men as well as the deci-
sions of judges, then there is no distinction between the administration
of private and criminal law; precedent is necessarily ignored as a figment
of the legalistic mind and a popular myth. The whole field of legal
relations, including litigation, becomes an "interstitial area." Psychol-
ogy, preferably of the subconscious, supplants knowledge of legal rules
and their correct deliberate application. So, also, self-conduct in accord-
ance with law becomes an illusion. The traditional analyses of rule
versus discretion, law versus equity, etc., become meaningless. Thus,
an intellectual movement, born of a vital necessity to modernize legal
systems and advanced by some of the most brilliant of modern phil-
osophers, falls into dangerous dogmatism.
The initial opposition to excessive reliance upon concepts and complete
acceptance of traditional abstractions was important and worthy. But
the validity of the initial positivist movement prtivides no intellectual
defense of its ultimate manifestations. On the contrary, rejection of the
efficacy of legal rules is both an illogical and unscientific nonsequitur of
the truth inhering in attempts to develop an empirical science of law-
though not, indeed, of the exaggeration and exhortation found there
all too frequently.
The relationship between modern criminology and sociological juris-
p)rudence is al)parent, as is that between extreme p.sitivism and extreme
realist jurisprudence; but it is obvious that there is every shade of
opinion concerning these relationships and that the above generalizations
are merely for purposes of analysis, not identificatio n of particular views.
Recent continental application of the Free Law school ideology to penal
law-one of the most instructive phenomena in all jurisprudence-
should reveal to criminologists and to extreme Legal Realists what are
some of the practical possibilities of uncontrolled positivism.
"VII. CONCLUSION
Emphasis has been deliberately placed upon certain merits of Classi-
cism and certain shortcomings of Positivism, but not because that repre-
sents an ultimate appraisal of each school; rather because the present
need is to secure a fair and sympathetic understanding of the Classicists
and their contributions. The great advance of the Positivists should
not, and, indeed, cannot be ignored. But corrections are necessary; and
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no better method of procedure can be adopted than revaluation in light
of the fundamental significance of Classicism.
The Classicists arose in an age of despotic governments, harsh laws,
and arbitrary judges. The Positivists inherited relatively liberal govern-
ment and the benign attitudes fostered by their predecessors. They were
free to disregard, for a time, the lesson of Classicism and to concentrate
upon what they regarded as scientific. In an age when democracy can
no longer be assumed, but must be deliberately conserved - or, perhaps,
even achieved- the writings of both schools of thought should be com-
pletely re-examined. Qne principle, at least, should be quite apparent:
criminology cannot profitably ignore politics or law, unless it desires
to run the danger of fostering evils far greater than those it seeks to
eliminate. For there is more involved than repression or elimination
of anti-social persons. Transcending that particular social purpose are
others, not the least of which concerns the means and methods employed.
Hence the chief task that now confronts criminologists is a phase of
what is one of the most vital problems of our times: from the point
of view of democratic societies, what is the most desirable relationship
between Science and other human Values? Hidden conflicts must be
discovered and expressed if sensible decisions are to be made.
If one asks why, at bottom, retroactivity of penal laws is objectionable,
why all sentences should not be capital or at least unusually cruel, why,
other factors constant, unequal sentences are unjust if applied to like
offenders in like circumstances, the answers will inevitably take the
form of certain "first principles." Once these "fundamental" values are
rejected, no amount of argument carries the slightest weight. One can
strive only to discover one's values and to understand them - in itself
an endless task. Those lying at the basis of liberal democracy affirm
the significance and ineffable worth of the individual human being. No
person is regarded as good enough to dominate any normal human being.
Even the all-powerful state, indeed, especially the all-powerful state, must
use the regular channels of due process before any individual can be
punished. So, but a few months ago, the United States Supreme Court,
an agency of the most powerful capitalist society ever known, declared
that a negro communist had been improperly convicted. Around an
accused, however degenerate, legal procedure and prescribed rules pro-
vide a cloak of dignity and self-esteem. That is the solemn and deliberate
regard of liberal democracy for the humblest of its citizens. The price
• for consistency with an ideal of the basic worth of each individual may
sometimes be paid grudgingly, but in the long run it is deemed a pittance
for the benefits conferred, the values expressed. If present, specific
devices for achieving and preserving these values are supplanted by dis-
cretion, which, without doubt, does have an important and proper sphere
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of operation, other devices must be discovered and employed to safe-
guard what is paramount. Quite apart from theoretical questions of
ethics is the need to lead raw behavior into human channels. Law wisely
applied - though it falls short of achieving this purpose - is one of the
best instructors that society has discovered. In light of the above dis-
cussion it is necessary to conclude that there should be a strong pre-
sumption in favor of legal control of penalization. The burden of proof
should be on those who claim superior knowledge and ability to attain
better results by extra-legal methods.
